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Talking Foreign Policy Transcript
October 1, 2019, broadcast: ”The Rohingya Genocide”1
Talking Foreign Policy is a one-hour radio program, hosted by Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law Co-Dean Michael Scharf, in which 
experts discuss the salient foreign policy issues of the day. The quarterly 
broadcast is produced in partnership between Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity, the only US law school with its own foreign policy talk radio 
program, and WCPN 90.3 FM Ideastream, Cleveland’s National Public 
Radio affiliate. The broadcast on October 1, 2019, addressed the Rohingya 
Genocide. Archived broadcasts are available for viewing in video format 
online at law.case.edu/TalkingForeignPolicy.
Each episode features a regular cast of participants, with Scharf serving 
as host:
• The ethicist: Shannon French, director of Case Western 
Reserve’s Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excellence;
• The military expert: Mike Newton, professor of law at 
Vanderbilt University;
• The international law professor: Milena Sterio, law professor 
at Cleveland State University; and
• The negotiator: Paul Williams, president of the Public Interna-
tional Law and Policy Group.
Participants 
Todd Buchwald 
Jenny Domino 
Michael Scharf 
Rebecca Hamilton 
Paul Williams
scharf: According to a recent UN report, Facebook bears responsibility 
for the worst humanitarian disaster on the planet—the mass attacks against the 
Rohingya people of Burma. Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy. I’m your host, 
1.  Transcript edited and footnotes added by Senior Cox International Law Center Fellow 
Laura Graham and Cox International Law Center Fellows Kathryn Meyer, Tessa Oates, and 
Natalie Davis.
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Michael Scharf,2 dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
In this broadcast, our expert panelists will help us understand the Rohingya 
crisis, the role of Facebook, and the prospects for achieving accountability 
for the international crimes that have been committed against the Rohingya 
people in Burma. Joining us today in our studio is Dr. Paul Williams,3 the 
founder of the Public International Law and Policy Group, a Nobel Peace 
Prize nominated NGO that was commissioned by the US Department of State 
to document the Rohingya crisis last year. Welcome back to our show, Paul.
williams: Thanks, Michael. It’s a pleasure to be here.
scharf: We’re also joined by Professor Milena Sterio4 of Cleveland 
State’s Marshall College of Law, who has an award-winning new book out 
by Cambridge University Press on international criminal law. It’s good to 
have you back on the show too, Milena.
sterio: It is great to be here.
scharf: We also have a newcomer, Professor Rebecca Hamilton5 of 
American University Washington College of Law, who is one of the nation’s 
leading experts at the role of social media in inciting atrocities. Prior to 
becoming a law professor, Rebecca was a prosecutor at the International 
Criminal Court, and a foreign correspondent for The Washington Post. 
Welcome to Talking Foreign Policy.
hamilton: So glad to be here.
scharf: Our final panelist for the start of our show is Todd Buchwald,6 
the former US Ambassador for Global Criminal Justice, who has just com-
2.  Michael Scharf, Case Western Reserve School of Law, https://law.case.edu/Our 
-School/Faculty-Staff/Meet-Our-Faculty/Faculty-Detail/id/142. Michael Scharf is the 
dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. He has also written and pub-
lished extensively in the area of international law.
3.  Paul Williams, American University Washington College of Law, https://www.wcl 
.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/pwilliams/bio. Paul Williams is a professor at 
American University Washington College of Law. He is also the president of the Public 
International Law and Policy Group, a Nobel Peace Prize nominated NGO that has pro-
vided legal counsel in a dozen peace negotiations over the past twenty-two years.
4.  Milena Sterio, Cleveland Marshall College of Law, https://www.law.csuohio.edu 
/newsevents/featuredfaculty/milena-sterio. Milena Sterio is the associate dean of Cleve-
land-Marshall College of Law and a renowned international law expert.
5.  Rebecca Hamilton, American University Washington College of Law, https://www 
.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/rehamilton/bio/. Rebecca Hamilton is an 
assistant professor at American University Washington College of Law and an expert in 
citizen activism and international law.
6.  Todd Buchwald, The Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/todd 
-buchwald. Todd Buchwald is a former ambassador and Special Coordinator for Global 
Criminal Justice at the US Department of State. 2
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pleted a year’s fellowship at The Wilson Center in Washington, DC, and 
is currently a visiting professor of international law at the University of 
Oklahoma College of Law. Welcome back to the show, Todd.
buchwald: Thank you, Michael. It’s great to be here.
scharf: And then in the second segment, we’re going to be joined by Jenny 
Domino,7 the Satter Fellow at Harvard Law School, and she has worked on 
hate speech on Facebook in Myanmar. So without further ado, let’s start out 
by looking at this issue, and we’ll begin with some background. There are 
some words here that we need to get a common understanding of and even 
a pronunciation. Let’s start with the Rohingya. That’s what I’ve been calling 
it. It’s not a household word. In fact, when I looked it up how to pronounce 
it, I learned that in America, they usually call them the “Roe-hing-a,” but 
in the country, they call them the “Roe-hinge-a,” and we’ll start with call-
ing them the “Roe-hing-a,” since we are in the United States, but we will 
know that.8 The other thing is the country where this is all taking place, 
Myanmar is also known as Burma, and we’ll go with Burma. Let’s start out 
with Milena. Tell us about who the Rohingya people are.
sterio: Sure. The Rohingya are a Muslim minority group.9 Most of 
them used to live in the western coastal state of Rakhine in Myanmar, or 
Burma, as you explained.10 They have been persecuted within Burma for a 
number of years. Under Burmese law, they are not officially recognized as 
one of the 135 official ethnic groups.11 They have been denied citizenship 
in Myanmar since 1982, which has effectively rendered them stateless, and 
recently, many of them have experienced severe persecution and have fled 
to the neighboring Bangladesh.12
scharf: Explain to us the history of why these people are so hated in 
their own country.
7.  Jenny Domino, LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/in/jenny-domino-a184ba153/. 
Jenny Domino is a former Satter Fellow at the Harvard Law School Human Rights Pro-
gram and is a current associate legal adviser at the International Commission of Jurists.
8. English Pronunciation of Rohingya, Cambridge Dictionary, last accessed Oct. 24, 2019, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/pronunciation/english/rohingya.
9.  Center for Migration Studies, “The Stateless Rohingya in Thailand,” https://cmsny.org 
/the-stateless-rohingya-in-thailand/.
10.  Chris Lewa, “North Arakan: An Open Prison for the Rohingya in Burma,” Forced 
Migration Review 32 (2009): 11.
11.  Azeem Ibrahim, “Myanmar Wants to Track Rohingya, Not Help Them,” Foreign Policy, 
Aug. 1, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/01/myanmar-wants-to-track-rohingya 
-not-help-them/.
12.  Center for Migration Studies, supra note 9. 
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sterio: The Rohingya were originally from Bengal, which is now 
known as Bangladesh, and the British—these were all British colonies—
brought the Rohingya to Myanmar during the colonial period back in the 
1880s.13 Now, during World War II, the Rohingyas mostly supported the 
British forces, whereas the other ethnic groups from Burma, who were 
Buddhists, supported the Japanese.14 So there’s some animosity that goes 
way back to World War II. After Myanmar’s independence post-World War 
II, the Rohingya were not officially recognized and have been essentially 
discriminated against ever since. Starting in 1982, they were denied a status 
of an official ethnic group in Burma, which has effectively rendered them 
stateless.15 The latest violence against them was sparked by the killing of 
nine Burmese border police officers in October of 2016, and the Burmese 
government blamed the Rohingya group as the culprits,16 which then 
culminated in the more severe persecution of the Rohingya over the last 
three years.
scharf: And where is the Rohingya crisis centered now?
sterio: Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees have fled to the 
neighboring country of Bangladesh, and many of the Rohingya refu-
gees—900,000 of them—live in a place called Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh.17 
But the flight of the Rohingya really started back in the 1970s, and since 
the 1970s, nearly one million Rohingya refugees have fled Myanmar due 
to widespread persecution.18
scharf: Alright, so it’s a horrible situation. In a minute, we’re going to 
talk about whether this violence can rise to the level of genocide, but to set 
the stage for that, Milena, can you tell us what the definition of genocide is?
sterio: Sure, genocide is defined in the so-called Genocide Convention, 
which was signed back in 1948 and came into effect in 1951 as an act com-
mitted with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
13.  Id.
14.  S. G. Jilanee, “The Rohingya Massacre,” South Asia, Sept. 30, 2019, Lexis. 
15.  Center for Migration Studies, supra note 9.
16.  “Myanmar Policemen Killed in Rakhine Border Attack,” BBC, Oct. 9, 2016, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37601.
17.  “Rohingya Emergency,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, https://www 
.unhcr.org/en-us/rohingya-emergency.html.
18.  “Who are the Rohingya?,” Al-Jazeera, Apr. 18, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com 
/indepth/features/2017/08/rohingya-muslims-170831065142812.html.
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racial, or religious group.19 This is a fairly narrow definition entails the 
committing of a killing or another heinous act, but it has to be directed 
at somebody who’s a member of one of these protected groups: a national, 
ethnic, racial, or religious group, and the person has to be targeted because 
of their membership in the protected group.20
scharf: I mentioned at the top of the show that we have Paul Williams 
with us. He is the president of the NGO, the Public International Law and 
Policy Group. Paul, I understand that your NGO was commissioned by 
the US Department of State to undertake a study of the violence against 
the Rohingya just last fall, and I understand that your team went over to 
Bangladesh and interviewed one thousand Rohingya refugees. Can you 
tell us what you discovered?
williams: Yes, Michael. We pulled together a team of a dozen and a 
half investigators with experience at the various international criminal 
tribunals, and we spent two months in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar.21 
We interviewed over a thousand, actually, 1,024 of the refugees, 15,000 
pages of documentation, and we identified over 13,000 crimes that had been 
committed against these people.22 What we had discovered was basically, 
in sum, that it was a premeditated and well-coordinated operation that was 
intended not only to expel, but to exterminate the Rohingya.23 We did a 
follow up report, where we conducted a legal analysis, and here we brought 
together a dozen former US government lawyers from the Department of 
Defense, the White House, and the State Department, and we said, “Look 
at this evidence in the way that you would look at it if you were still in the 
US government. Be critical, be jaundiced, be very focused on whether or 
19.  United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, Art. II., 78 UNTS 276.
20.  Id., See also: Todd Buchwald and Adam Keith, “By Any Other Name: US Government 
Statements about ‘Genocide,’” United States Holocaust Museum (March 2019): 11, https://
www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Todd_Buchwald_Report_031819.pdf.
21.  Paul R. Williams and Jessica Levy, “Atrocities Documented, Accountability Needed: 
Finding Justice for the Rohingya through the ICC and Independent Mechanism,” Harvard 
Human Rights J., Feb. 25, 2019, https://harvardhrj.com/2019/02/atrocities-documented 
-accountability-needed-finding-justice-for-the-rohingya-through-the-icc-and 
-independent-mechanism-by-paul-r-williams-jessica-levy.
22.  Id.
23.  “Documenting Atrocity Crimes Committed Against the Rohingya in Myanmar’s 
Rakhine State: Factual Findings and Legal Analysis Report,” PILPG (2018): 50–51, http://
pilpg.org/rohingya-report, archived at https://perma.cc/NKR2-S6W7.
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not, don’t apply your NGO lens, apply your government lens.”24 And they 
came back and said, “Crimes against humanity, war crimes,” and they even 
came back and said, “This amounts to potential genocide.”25
scharf: Wow. They call it the “G-word.” It’s very powerful. What 
happened when you told the State Department—who had asked you to 
create this report—that you believed, based on the evidence, that they 
should say that this is genocide?
williams: The State Department, I believe, was on the cusp of identify-
ing these atrocities, not only as crimes against humanity, but also genocide, 
but then it got caught up in a quintessential one-act play of Washington. 
The Secretary of State had a draft speech, and the speech said, “We have 
this evidence, we have this documentation, we the State Department find 
that there are crimes against humanity and, in brackets, “genocide.”26 
They put it in brackets because it was a draft speech and they were still 
trying to decide whether or not—in consultation with the legal office and 
the political folks—to say genocide.27 A senior staffer then leaked it to the 
news media, and that blocked out the ability of the Secretary of State to 
make a determination, because he couldn’t go either way. It would look 
like he was being manipulated by his own staff and by the news media. 
But Capitol Hill stepped in, and the House of Representatives, in a vote 
of 394–1, voted that genocide had been committed against the Rohingya, 
and encouraged the State Department and the White House to impose 
economic sanctions and to pursue criminal accountability.28 
scharf: Wow. Alright, Ambassador Todd Buchwald, the US Holocaust 
Memorial Museum commissioned you to produce a report, which was 
published this past April, on how the State Department has historically 
gone about deciding to say, or not to say, that genocide has occurred in a 
conflict. Can you summarize what you found and apply it to what Paul 
just told us about the Rohingya?
24.  Williams and Levy, supra note 21. 
25.  Id.
26.  Nahal Toosi, “Leaked Pompeo Statement Shows Debate Over ‘Genocide’ Label for 
Myanmar,” Politico, Aug. 13, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/13/mike 
-pompeo-state-department-genocide-myanmar-775270.
27.  Id.
28. Letter from Eliot Engle, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, et al. to Mike 
Pompeo, Secretary of State, US Department of State, Feb. 15, 2019, https://foreignaffairs 
.house.gov/2019/2/house-foreign-affairs-committee-leadership-calls-on-administration 
-to-recognize-rohingya-genocide.
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buchwald: Thank you, Michael. We spent a lot of time looking at this 
in our report, which was commissioned before the events that Paul is talking 
about. As it turns out, there is no formal process for making determinations 
about genocide.29 You can’t find a regulation or a department procedure, but 
there’s a kind of de facto process that has emerged that you can glean from 
looking at the way the issue’s been handled in the past. And in the modern 
era since Yugoslavia and Rwanda, that have framed the way that the process 
has developed.30 In the Rwanda and Bosnian genocides, in both those cases, 
what you had was a senior level of leadership in the Department that was 
resistant to saying a genocide had occurred because they were afraid of being 
cornered into doing things that they didn’t want pressure to do, and lower-
level people using the idea of a genocide determination trying to press the 
department principles to make it, to make the determination, writing memos 
up to the seventh floor to the department principles, and the department 
principles resisting.31 Then, fast forward to the next major episode, which 
was the Darfur genocide in determination in 2004, and you had—
scharf: Let me stop you there, because we actually have with us Professor 
Rebecca Hamilton, whose book, Fighting for Darfur, is all about why the US 
government was willing and able to use the “G-word,” as I say, to describe 
Darfur. Can you complete the story that Ambassador Buchwald has begun?
hamilton: By the time that Darfur started unfolding, there had been a 
lot of publicity and a lot of work done by journalists that, I think, recounted 
just the extent of the US government’s failings in Rwanda ten years earlier, 
and that weighed very heavily on people in the State Department, including 
then Secretary of State Colin Powell, who really took this on as his issue 
and decided to hold off for a genocide.32
scharf: So what is it about the word genocide that the State Department 
is so afraid of? Ambassador Buchwald?
buchwald: Well, I think it goes back to what we saw in the Bosnia 
and Rwanda era, where the Department leadership, the administration 
29. Todd Buchwald and Adam Keith, “By Any Other Name: US Government Statements 
about ‘Genocide,’” United States Holocaust Museum (March 2019): 3, https://www.ushmm 
.org/m/pdfs/Todd_Buchwald_Report_031819.pdf.
30.  Id.
31.  Id.
32.  Rebecca Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide, 
abstract (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). See also supra note 29 at 8.
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leadership, tends to be risk-averse, and doesn’t want to do something that 
will then create pressure on the State Department, on the administration, 
to intervene in a way that they’re not prepared to intervene.33
scharf: Are there actual legal obligations if they say it’s genocide, or 
is it all politics?
buchwald: There are legal obligations, but when you really get the 
“wheat” jobs, it’s scrape the wheat from the chaff. The legal obligations 
aren’t what are driving things.34 The legal obligations are fairly minimal, 
insofar as it relates to this issue.35 There are, as you know, obligations to 
criminalize genocide and so forth, but the big legal question is how to 
interpret the obligation to prevent genocide.36 And if you look at the internal 
memorandum that the State Department produced in these episodes, and 
the advice the lawyers in the State Department were providing, it’s clear 
that their view is that the obligation to prevent isn’t an obligation to prevent 
in your own country.37 It doesn’t apply offshore, so that’s not it, and that’s 
what the department leaders get. But the fact that there’s no legal obliga-
tion doesn’t necessarily affect the reality for the policymakers that they 
will get political pressure.38 I should also say that the legal interpretation 
is not obvious. It’s not actually consistent with decisions, for example, the 
International Court of Justice and many scholars, but that is the internal 
advice that the lawyers in the department give.39
scharf: Alright, so we’ve gotten to the place where the facts indicate that 
it’s genocide—the PILPG, Paul’s NGO, officially declare it to be genocide, 
the US Congress says it’s genocide, and reluctantly, the Department of State 
allows that to be the last word. Let’s take a short break while we mull over 
what that means. When we return, we’ll talk about the role of Facebook 
in the Rohingya genocide, and then we’ll finally look at the potential for 
prosecutions. We’ll be back in a moment.
scharf: Welcome back to Talking Foreign Policy, brought to you by Case 
Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 Ideastream. I’m Michael 
33.  Buchwald & Keith, supra note 29.
34.  Id. at 18.
35.  Id.
36.  Id. at 19.
37.  Id. at 53, 61.
38.  Id. at 59.
39.  Id. at 51, 61.
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Scharf, dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law. We’re 
talking today about the atrocities committed against the Rohingya people 
of Burma. Before the break we were discussing whether it matters whether 
the attacks are called genocide or crimes against humanity. Before we move 
on to discuss the role of Facebook, I want to go to Rebecca Hamilton and 
have you explore that a little bit further.
hamilton: The decision by the US government to call something geno-
cide—or by any government to call it genocide—makes a huge difference to 
victims. So whenever genocide occurs, there is intrinsic value to naming it 
by its proper name. And that is something that I have heard from genocide 
survivors all around the world. I think it’s a separate question, though, in 
terms of the policy impact. I think that a genocide determination ends 
up giving people less than they might imagine or hope for. A little bit to 
Todd’s earlier point, the US government will go as far as its happy to go. 
What we’ve never yet seen is a genocide determination actually impact a 
traditional national interest calculation. We haven’t seen it mean that we’re 
willing to have US casualties or that the US government is willing to have 
it disrupt its key diplomatic relationships. 
scharf: Now what’s, in my opinion, the most extraordinary aspect of 
this is that this genocide would not have occurred, but for—according to 
the UN—the role of Facebook, a US company.40 According to the UN 
report, ultra-nationalists use Facebook to incite the violence against the 
Rohingya and that Facebook is the only source of news for the majority 
of the Burmese people.41 And they also concluded that there was a correla-
tion between the posts on Facebook and the attack. I’m going to bring Jen 
Domino in. You’re an expert in this area. Can you tell us more about that?
domino: Thanks for having me on your show. Actually, I just want to 
push back a little bit. There are various sources of news, and it was also in the 
UN report. So you have a lot of state-owned media in Myanmar, and since 
its transition to democracy they’ve also had non-state-owned media.42 But 
the difference here is that because state-owned media has a disproportionate 
40.  Tom Miles, “UN Investigators Cite Facebook Role in Myanmar crisis,” Reuters, Mar. 
12, 2018, 5:40 p.m., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-facebook
/u-n-investigators-cite-facebook-role-in-myanmar-crisis-idUSKCN1GO2PN. 
41.  United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar,” ¶¶ 73 & 74, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, Sept. 12, 2018.
42.  “Myanmar Profile–Media,” BBC, May 2, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world
-asia-pacific-12991727. 
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amount of reach and resources compared to non-state-owned media. Face-
book becomes more important because it provided a voice to many people, 
who, prior to their democratic transition, did not have a space where they 
could speak, and so, despite various media sources, leading religious and 
government figures still used Facebook, because it allowed them a platform 
which was not available to everyone before Facebook came to Myanmar.43
scharf: So you’re saying that it wasn’t the only source of news, but it 
was an important source of news, and therefore it became very dangerous 
what was being posted. Well, why didn’t Facebook just remove these posts 
inciting the violence?
domino: Actually, I also want to add that the government narrative against 
the Rohingya had been there for many years. And Facebook—it didn’t start 
with Facebook posts—but Facebook provided a tool to reinforce those narra-
tives on a wider scale. And I think, to answer your question, the reason why 
Facebook didn’t take down those posts, it wasn’t just on top of their priorities 
scharf: They claim they didn’t have translators, they didn’t know that these 
inciting words were being said. Is that a credible statement from Facebook?
domino: Well, civil society had alerted them to hate speech on Facebook 
for years preceding the attacks. But despite the alerts, Facebook didn’t really 
do enough.44 And in a popular interview in Vox last year Mark Zuckerberg 
said himself that their systems detected hate speech, but Myanmar civil 
society actually corrected him days later and he apologized.45 It was actually 
them, and not the algorithms, that detected the hate speech. 
scharf: But once they brought it to his attention and he couldn’t escape 
from the conclusion being that his Facebook was being used to incite this 
kind of violence, he did publicly promise to take action to deal with these 
violent posts on Facebook,46 right?
43.  “Human Rights Impact Assessment: Facebook in Myanmar,” BSR 7, October 2018, 
https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/bsr-facebook-myanmar-hria_final 
.pdf.
44.  “Facebook ‘too slow’ in Removing Anti-Rohingya Hate Speech,” Al Jazeera, Aug. 16, 
2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/facebook-slow-removing-anti-rohingya 
-hate-speech-180816093622390.html. 
45.  Evelyn Douek, “Facebook’s Role in the Genocide in Myanmar: New Reporting 
Complicates the Narrative,” LawFare Blog, Oct. 22, 2018, 9:01 a.m., https://www 
.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-role-genocide-myanmar-new-reporting-complicates 
-narrative.
46.  Alexandra Stevenson, “Facebook Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myan-
mar,” New York Times, Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/
myanmar-facebook.html.
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domino: Yes. I think by that time though, they began to pay attention 
after other scandals had occurred—Cambridge Analytica—and so there 
was international pressure on Facebook for a wide range of issues. And at 
that time, that’s when they finally said last year that we would be doing 
more to tackle this issue.
scharf: But even after he publicly said this in his testimony to the Senate, 
Reuters reported the following posts on Facebook in Burma. According 
to Reuters, one user posted “We must fight them the way Hitler did the 
Jews, damn kalars!”47 which is a pejorative for the Rohingya. Another post 
showed a news article from an army-controlled publication about attacks 
on police stations by Rohingya militants. “These non-human kalar dogs, 
the Bengalis, are killing and destroying our land, our water and our ethnic 
people,” the user wrote. “We need to destroy their race.”48 Another user 
shared a photo of a boatload of Rohingya refugees landing in Indonesia.49 
“Pour fuel and set fire so that they can meet Allah faster,” a commenter 
wrote.50 
Now, how do those get on Facebook after Zuckerberg says, “I will take 
action to prevent that”?51
domino: I think it’s also because Facebook is such a big company. The 
policy at the top level is very hard to translate to content moderation 
which is done by humans and their technology.52 So it’s just not as fast as 
we would want it to be.
scharf: And why didn’t he just completely withdraw Facebook from 
Burma?
domino: Well, I wouldn’t support that either. Because Facebook, as I 
said, in a country transitioning to democracy, serves a very useful role there 
47.  Steve Stecklow, “Special Report: Why Facebook is Losing the War on Hate Speech in 
Myanmar,” Reuters, Aug. 15, 2018, 3:51 p.m., https://www.reuters.com/article/us 
-myanmar-facebook-hate-specialreport/special-report-why-facebook-is-losing-the-war 
-on-hate-speech-in-myanmar-iduskbn1l01jy. 
48.  Id.
49.  Id.
50.  Id. 
51.  Bloomberg Government, “Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate hearing,” Washing-
ton Post, Apr. 11, 2018, 3:25 a.m., https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch 
/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/. 
52.  Douek, supra note 45.
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because people don’t have a space where they could talk.53 There’s still a 
lot of self-censorship in Burma, and Facebook provided a space where all 
these people previously repressed and silent can finally speak.54
scharf: Alright, well, Facebook—it’s a tool and it can be used for good 
or bad. Let me bring Rebecca Hamilton back into this. I understand that 
your current research is about how ordinary people in atrocity situations 
have actually been documenting the crimes they have witnessed by post-
ing them on social media.55 Is this type of user-generated evidence a good 
thing for international justice?
hamilton: It can be. And I think when we’re thinking about Myanmar 
it’s very easy to pile on the social media companies and appropriately so, but I 
think it’s true that for many vulnerable populations, social media is enabling 
them to document the crimes that are happening in their communities and 
to broadcast those crimes out to the world and that is especially important 
in situations like we see in Syria for example, where the government is not 
letting external investigators in.56 Now, whether it’s ultimately going to be 
a good thing for international justice? I think it depends. Certainly there’s 
a whole lot of security issues, that come with user-generated evidence for 
people who are doing that documentation. And it would be really sad if 
international criminal investigations prioritize this kind of documentation 
over the sort of in-person interviews that are so important for the survivors 
of these crimes.
scharf: But what I’m hearing from the two of you though is that it’s 
a pretty complicated question about what Facebook ought to be doing in 
Burma. It has a good role and has a bad role. It doesn’t necessarily know 
all of the ways that it is being abused. Rebecca, what did you want to add?
hamilton: So I’m also in the camp that I think Myanmar wants Face-
book. They just want a better Facebook, right? Okay, but I do think there 
are really important questions for not just Facebook but of social media 
53.  Emilie Lehmann-Jacobsen, “Myanmar’s Media from an Audience Perspective,” IMS-
FOJO, September 2018, https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09 
/Audiences-in-Myanmar_2018_finalweb.pdf.
54.  Id. 
55. Hamilton, Rebecca J., “User-Generated Evidence,” Aug. 15, 2018, Columbia J. Transnat’l 
Law 57, no.1 (2018); Am U., WCL Research Paper No. 2018-11. http://jtl.columbia.edu 
/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/01/1-Hamilton_UGE-Online.pdf. 
56.  Id.; See also Rebecca J. Hamilton, “Atrocity Prevention in the New Media Landscape,” 
AJIL Unbound 113 (2019): 262, 262.
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companies to be asking before they launch into markets where there isn’t a 
strong independent media, where the rule of law is not strong, and where 
people are emerging from decades of civil war, and you cannot expect your 
product to run in the same way as it does in a liberal democracy, so you 
need to put systems in place in advance of going into those markets to be 
prepared for what can happen.
scharf: And I suppose you would say, if a very sophisticated company, 
a very wealthy company like Facebook did not consider that, that that was 
sort of a form of negligence? Inviting this kind of danger?
hamilton: I’m certainly very concerned about it. At the most basic level, 
they didn’t even translate their community guidelines.57 The standards for 
what you are or are not allowed to post on their site, didn’t translate them 
into the local languages. 
scharf: Was that willful blindness or was that just laziness?
domino: They translated it, but I think not early enough58 
hamilton: Exactly–they didn’t translate it before they went into the 
market.
scharf: Okay, so now let’s go back to our expert at the legal aspects of 
genocide, Milena Sterio. Is there precedent for prosecuting incitement to 
genocide by media owners?
sterio: So there is precedent for prosecuting incitement for genocide, the 
first person to be prosecuted for incitement as a hate crime, as a crime against 
humanity, was a person called Julius Streicher who was actually prosecuted 
at the Nuremberg Tribunal.59 He was the publisher of an anti-Semitic Ger-
man weekly and he was prosecuted and convicted and sentenced to death at 
Nuremberg and at the time, this is prosecuted as a crime against humanity.60 
scharf: Now was he prosecuted for the words that he published or for 
providing a platform for others to make these genocidal words?
sterio: He certainly did not write all of the words himself, he was the 
publisher of the paper. Now, there are other examples from the Rwanda 
57.  Stecklow, supra note 47. 
58.  Id.
59.  Margaret Eastwood, The Emergence of Incitement to Genocide within the Nuremberg Trial 
Process: The Case of Julius Streicher (Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), http://clok.uclan.ac.uk 
/19300/.
60.  Id. 
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tribunal. In the Rwanda Tribunal there were three defendants who were 
prosecuted for incitement to genocide.61 Now, these are individuals who 
actually spoke words of incitement, that’s a little bit different. 
scharf: Anybody who just owned a radio station and allowed the words 
to be used. 
sterio: Well, according to the Rwanda Tribunal, legal incitement in this 
context means encouraging or persuading another to commit an offense 
by ways of communication for example, by using broadcast publications, 
drawings, images or speeches, and the person who is inciting has to have the 
intent for the person receiving this information to commit the genocide-
elect.62 Now, even if the person receiving the information does not commit 
the act, they for some reason decide not to do it, the person who is doing 
the incitement can actually still be prosecuted for incitement.
scharf: So could a social media platforms such as Facebook be held 
accountable for enabling incitement to genocide? 
sterio: The trick here would be, is Facebook encouraging or persuading 
anyone to do genocidal things? And I think Facebook would say, “we’re 
not encouraging, we’re just this neutral platform.” 
scharf: So just being neutral or negligent, as Rebecca was saying, or 
just not making the priority as Jen was saying, or not caring. That’s not 
enough, you actually have to want it, right? 
sterio: I think that could maybe mean entail criminal responsibility 
for some kind of criminal negligence but it’s not enough for genocide.
scharf: We’ll ask Jen this. How long did it go on that after the NGOs 
told Facebook this was happening, that Facebook continued to ignore the 
problem?
domino: To my recollection, they started alerting Facebook as early as 
2011, and it was only in 2018 when they started to roll out all these initia-
tives to improve their content moderation, there.63
61.  William A. Shabas, “Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide,” McGill L. J. 46: 
141 (2000), https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/mcgil46 
&div=20&id=&page=.
62.  Richard Ashby Wilson, “Inciting Genocide with Words,” Mich. J. Of Int’l Law 36: 277, 
289–290 (2015), http://www.mjilonline.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/06 
/Wilson.pdf.
63.  Matthew Ingram, “Facebook Slammed by UN for Its Role in Myanmar 
Genocide,” Columbia Journalism Rev., Nov. 8, 2018, https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today 
/facebook-un-myanmar-genocide.php.
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scharf: At some point, doesn’t negligence, become some kind of mens 
rea that’s higher than intent?
sterio: Intent is the highest in criminal law, and in international criminal 
law, extremely difficult to prove.64 And as much as I think that there is 
criminal negligence on behalf of Facebook or a platform that is similar, I 
don’t think that there is genocidal intent to incite violence.65 
scharf: Alright, this is interesting. You could prosecute incitement for 
some other crime of violence other than genocide where depraved heart 
would be enough, right?
sterio: If it’s a lower mens rea—
scharf: But it’s because genocide has the highest level of intent that it’s 
so hard to prosecute.66
sterio: Yeah, remember the German publisher at the Nuremburg Tribu-
nal was prosecuted at the time as a crime against humanity, not as genocide, 
so there isn’t the same level of strict intent required.67
scharf: Alright, now let me switch back over to Ambassador Todd 
Buchwald. What do you think the lessons are for Facebook related to the 
atrocities of the Rohingya people in Burma? 
buchwald: Right. The thing with the social media companies is the 
control that the publisher as opposed to newspapers that control the publisher 
has over the content is more remote. But I do think we have to find ways 
to incentivize social media to be more vigilant. That’s clearly what has to 
happen here, and if it doesn’t, the law will catch up on the intent issues 
over time because it sort of can’t go on this way. More broadly, I think that 
the issue of whether the incitement or whatever it is, to genocide shouldn’t 
depend so much on whether it’s genocide or not genocide. It just really 
doesn’t matter. There is a facilitation of horrible atrocities and it’s a mistake 
to put too much emphasis on the horror we feel based on whether that 
word does or does not fit the legal definition that’s in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.68
64.  Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law: The Case 
for a Unified Approach, 412–414 (Hart Publishing, 2013).
65.  Wilson, supra note 62. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Eastwood, supra note 59.
68.  United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9 1948, Art. II., 78 UNTS 276.
15
Radio Broadcast (Oct. 1, 2019): Talking Foreign Policy: The Rohingya Genocide
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2020
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership   Fall 2020 106
scharf: Ambassador, when we were talking earlier about the State 
Department’s reluctance to use what I call the “G-word,” it seems that most 
of that is political.69 The genocide word has this political power that crimes 
against humanity doesn’t have. What you’re saying is a person convicted of 
crimes against humanity can spend as much time in jail, and it’s considered 
an equally bad crime.70
buchwald: . . . Equally has to be stopped, whether it’s equally—. Those 
are questions that, in a way, don’t matter. I mean, they matter to victims, 
they have a certain intrinsic importance, but the ultimate thing is that we 
have to orient our policy to prevent these things from happening. By the 
time there’s a serious question about whether a set of crimes constitutes 
genocide, it might or might not constitute genocide, but it’s of a severity that 
warrants the kind of vigorous response that shouldn’t depend on whether 
the word applies as a technical matter, or not. When the State Department 
goes through the process of deciding to say genocide there is historically a 
certain reluctance, but there’s historically also a difficulty with the defini-
tion. The definition has its own idiosyncrasies that have to be met that 
are difficult to meet.71 And if you look at the international court cases, it’s 
difficult to show genocide. My point is, don’t let the naming of the crime 
have to occur before we’re going to take steps to prevent it. 
scharf: Let’s just say this crime is murder. Mass murder. 
buchwald: Yeah.
scharf: And it is being committed by using Facebook as an instrument 
for inciting it and the owners of Facebook may have been so negligent that 
it is a level of negligence that is depraved heart, that could be incitement 
for murder, not genocide but murder. Why didn’t the US take any action 
against Facebook? Could it?
buchwald: I’m not sure that anybody in the US government made the 
determination about Facebook’s motivations that you just made. Actually, 
I don’t really know anything about the motivation to the particular sites. 
scharf: Let’s ask our experts Rebecca and Jen. Did anybody in the US 
government make those kinds of determinations?
69.  Buchwald & Keith, supra note 29.
70.  Id.
71.  Id. 
16
The International Journal of Ethical Leadership, Vol. 7 [2020], Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol7/iss1/11
107Talking Foreign Policy Transcripts
domino: Not to my knowledge. 
hamilton: This has not come before the US government in the way that 
you’ve presented it. And I also was going to add, I’m not sure that criminal 
law is the best fit for thinking about Facebook’s responsibility here.72
domino: I agree with her on that. 
scharf: Okay, so then what would be . . . 
hamilton: I mean, I think civil liability. It’s an interesting—
scharf: So somebody could sue Facebook? 
hamilton: Right, and in ways that no matter where you ended up with 
the suit, perhaps it would incentivize Facebook—looking forward as they 
go into other markets—to be really sure that they have the cultural com-
petence to understand how their platform might be used in that market.73 
scharf: Did anybody bring such a suit?
domino: No, not yet, but that’s the problem. So just to support what 
Rebecca said, the problem, there’s an obsession now with conceptualizing 
harm in terms of criminal law that in other discourses such civil liability 
are eclipsed. And so the problem is under international law, there’s no 
equivalent tort that could somehow conceptualize the harm that companies 
like Facebook, exercise on the global stage.74
hamilton: And just to be clear, I think there’s absolutely a crucial 
international criminal law conversation to be had around this situation for 
the individual perpetrators of the genocide, but that may not be the right 
fit, and I personally don’t think it is the right fit, for where Facebook sits 
within this landscape.75 
scharf: Okay, well, it is time for another short break and we will have 
that conversation here, on Talking Foreign Policy when we return back in 
a moment.
72.  Oona A. Hathaway, Paul K. Strauch, Beatrice A. Walton, Zoe A. Y. Weinberg, “What Is 
A War Crime?,” 44 Yale J. Int’l l. 53, 75 (2019).
73.  Ingrid Burrington, “Could Facebook Be Tried For Human-Rights Abuses?,” Atlantic 
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/12/could 
-facebook-be-tried-for-war-crimes/548639/.
74.  Id. 
75.  Jordan J. Paust, “The Need for New US Legislation for Prosecution of Genocide and 
Other Crimes Against Humanity,” Vt. Law Rev. 33 (2009): 717, https://lawreview 
.vermontlaw.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/17-Paust-Book-4-Vol-33.pdf.
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scharf: This is Michael Scharf and we’re back with Talking Foreign 
Policy. I’m joined today by some of the world’s foremost international law 
and human rights experts, and we’ve been talking about the genocide of 
the Rohingya people in Burma. In this final segment of our broadcast, 
we’ll look at efforts to bring the perpetrators of some of the worst atroci-
ties seen in years to justice. Let’s begin with Dr. Paul Williams. Paul, can 
you tell us what, if any, efforts are currently ongoing to pave the way for 
accountability for these atrocity crimes in Burma?
williams: Well Michael, I’m almost certain that in the very near future 
we will have some degree of accountability because there are intense efforts 
to hold those responsible at the military and at the political level for these 
atrocities that have been committed against the Rohingya. The UN Human 
Rights Council has a commission of inquiry, which has been very active, 
and recently issued yet another report finding not only that genocide had 
occurred but that there are 600,000 Rohingya still in Burma living under 
the threat of genocide.76 There’s also increased domestic documentation 
in the refugee camps themselves. The Rohingya are themselves learning 
how to use social media and other tools to document what has happened 
to them and what is an ongoing crisis and an ongoing crime.77 And the 
Bangladesh government was very clever in finding a way of getting this 
case before the International Criminal Court.78 Now there’s a narrow 
jurisdictional ban but we can come back to that, and then finally there is 
something called the Independent International Mechanism for Myanmar 
which is gathering evidence and preparing cases that could then be picked 
up by an international court, hybrid tribunal, or domestic prosecutions.79 
scharf: And what’s interesting to me about the description of all the 
players that you just gave us- none of them were created by the UN Security 
Council. And I want to go back to Ambassador Buchwald. You were at the 
State Department during the creation of the special investigative commission 
76.  UN Press Release, “Myanmar’s Rohingya Persecuted, Living under Threat of Geno-
cide, UN Experts Say,” Sep. 16, 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages 
/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24991&LangID=E.
77.  Laignee Barron, “Meet the Woman Documenting Sexual Violence Against Myanmar’s 
Rohingya,” Time, Mar. 27, 2019, https://time.com/5559388/razia-sultana-rohingya 
-myanmar-sexual-violence-documentation/.
78.  Michael Safi, “ICC Says It Can Prosecute Myanmar for Alleged Rohingya Crimes,” 
Guardian, Sep. 6, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/06/icc-says-it-can 
-prosecute-myanmar-for-alleged-rohingya-crimes.
79.  Williams & Levy, supra note 21. 
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by the Security Council for the Former Yugoslavia. You were there when 
they created a special commission to investigate Rwanda. Why is the Security 
Council not involved in the creation of these mechanisms for Burma?
buchwald: There’s clearly not enough consensus within the Security 
Council to make it happen and I think as the United States and other 
permanent members of the Security Council chart a Security Council 
policy going forward they need to take account of the fact that if they’re 
not willing to act, the playing field will shift to other bodies. 
scharf: Is there a country that is threatening the veto? I mean, you’re 
being very diplomatic, what’s really going on?
buchwald: It’s very hard to get consensus from the Russians and the 
Chinese80 and this administration if you sort of think about possible sce-
narios, including a referral by the Security Council to the International 
Criminal Court, it’s hard to imagine this administration in support.
scharf: But looking at the situation in Syria as a comparison, it was 
Russia that blocked any investigative commission from being created for 
Syria through a veto. Is that right?81
buchwald: It was Russia and China.82 
scharf: Okay and then in that case I think that was the first time in 
modern times the General Assembly decided to create the commission 
the triple-I-M it’s called.83 And now it’s the Human Rights Council that’s 
creating the double-I double-M.84 If you’re in this area they have initials 
for everything, but Paul just explained to us what that stood for. And you’re 
describing that, Ambassador, as a shift of power away from the Security 
Council.
buchwald: And a consequence of the Security Council not stepping up 
to the plate. If in a big international system if an important player isn’t doing 
80.  “UN Security Council Mulls Myanmar Action; Russia, China Boycott Talks,” Reuters, 
Dec. 17, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/u-n-security 
-council-mulls-myanmar-action-russia-china-boycott-talks-idUSKBN1OG2CJ.
81.  “Russia and China Veto UN Resolution Against Syrian Regime,” Guardian, Oct. 4, 
2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/05/russia-china-veto-syria 
-resolution. 
82.  Id. 
83.  “Syria: UN Approves Mechanism to Lay Groundwork for Investigations into Possible 
War Crimes,” UN News, Dec. 22, 2016, https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/12/548392 
-syria-un-approves-mechanism-lay-groundwork-investigations-possible-war-crimes.
84.  Human Rights Council Res. 39/2, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/L.22, at 1, Sep. 25, 2018.
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what’s needed, other mechanisms, other vehicles, will be found to make those 
things happen. To put pressure on those other vehicles. And the General 
Assembly does not have the power to make legally binding decisions like 
the Security Council has, but the pressure will be inexorable for the other 
bodies in the multilateral assessment to find ways to deal with these issues.
scharf: And what’s interesting about the double-I double-M, that’s the 
Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, is that it is mandated 
to prepare criminal cases. Isn’t that right?85
buchwald: Yes.
scharf: Which is an unusual thing for one of these bodies coming out 
of the Human Rights Council?
buchwald: It’s coming out of Human Rights Council but it’s sort of 
modeled on the Syria example and the idea is to move from a human rights 
information collecting oriented body, like the fact-finding mission, to a 
body whose purpose is to develop sort of evidence and quality input for 
what would eventually be a criminal trial.86 Notwithstanding that we don’t 
know exactly where that criminal trial will ultimately be held, whether it 
be in future Myanmar or a third country or in the International Criminal 
Court but the idea of getting the case files ready is an important step.
scharf: Now Paul, you mentioned that the Human Rights Council 
had a previous investigative body that was a very public investigation. Is 
the double-I double-M a private secretive investigation?
williams: Well the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar 
is designed to prepare the actual cases, the profile so to speak, that could 
be picked up by some type of prosecutorial mechanism so you won’t see 
a lot of release of information or of reports.87 This will be something that 
the International Criminal Court or another state which is invoking uni-
versal jurisdiction, which Milena is an expert in, if they want to prosecute 
a general or a political leader for their responsibility in this genocide or 
these crimes against humanity, they can request that file.88
scharf: You know a theme that often comes up in international laws 
is the principle of unintended consequences. Is it possible that an unin-
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Williams & Levy, supra note 21.
88.  Id. 
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tended consequence of creating this new mechanism is that there is now 
an information gap for public information and public pressure on Burma 
during this period of time?
williams: There’s a risk of that, that’s why I think it’s hugely important to 
continue the documentation efforts and in particular to empower Rohingya 
NGOs, non-governmental organizations, to do their own documentation 
and to keep that flow of information which meets or aspires to meet inter-
national standards that can then be used as information or as evidence to 
keep that going because that’s part of the victim catharsis process as well 
as laying the foundation for eventual accountability.
scharf: Now you spoke of the International Criminal Court, Ambas-
sador Buchwald mentioned it, the International Criminal Court only has 
jurisdiction over the state parties when their nationals commit crimes or 
when crimes are committed in their territory.89 In this case the nationals 
who are being accused are Burmese and Burma is not a state party.90 So 
let me turn to Rebecca Hamilton. You previously served as a prosecutor at 
the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The ICC recently opened 
an investigation into the Rohingya situation, and it was confirmed by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber.91 How is that possible given what I just said and what 
hurdles does the ICC face in prosecuting this case? 
hamilton: Yeah, so the Court has said that the prosecutor can start to 
open an investigation and they’ve done this on what is an unusual theory 
that the prosecutor presented to the court which is that because Bangla-
desh, neighboring to Myanmar, is a party to the court and because some 
of the crimes, in particular forcible deportation or displacement of the 
Rohingya, are not completed until those populations are moved onto the 
territory of Bangladesh, that therefore the court can get jurisdiction over 
those crimes.92 So we’re not talking about the whole range of crimes that 
have been committed against the Rohingya, but those where an element 
of the crime was committed on the territory of Bangladesh.93 
89.  “How the Court Works,” ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works.
90.  Id. 
91.  Param-Preet Singh, “ICC Prosecutor Seeking to Investigate Crimes Against 
Rohingya,” Human Rights Watch, June 26, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/
icc-prosecutor-seeking-investigate-crimes-against-rohingya.
92.  Michael Safi, “ICC Says It Can Prosecute Myanmar for Alleged Rohingya Crimes,” 
Guardian, Sep. 6, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/06/icc-says-it 
-can-prosecute-myanmar-for-alleged-rohingya-crimes.
93.  Id. 
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scharf: So this may be a little technical but forcible deportation is that 
part of the crime against humanity, of persecution, or is it part of genocide? 
hamilton: Yes, it’s a crime against humanity94 and that is what the 
case looks like it will go forward on but we haven’t yet seen what that full 
case is going to look like.
scharf: What’s your guess about how likely this would lead to a suc-
cessful prosecution?
hamilton: So I think the crime base is clearly there from the documen-
tation work that we’ve been discussing, that the fact-finding mission has 
done, that Paul’s organization has done. The question—the challenge—
always with these prosecutions is, do you have the linkage evidence to tie 
this to an individual perpetrator when, as you highlighted, that perpetra-
tor is going to be someone Burmese who is inside Myanmar? And the 
Myanmar government obviously has no interest in seeing accountability 
for these crimes.95
scharf: Paul, in your report did you name any names?
williams: We did not publicly name any names in our report.96 As part of 
our collection of information and data, plenty of information was provided 
about the various units that were engaged in these types of activities.97 We 
had a number of former military personnel who had done similar types of 
investigations before as part of our investigative team and they asked the 
questions with that in mind, thinking specifically of command and control.98 
If you identify the unit and then you could track back the orders to see 
who the generals were that were either directing or aiding and abetting or 
complicit in this genocide. 
scharf: Milena Sterio, what would you add to this?
sterio: I think that this is a very interesting case. I think it will definitely 
be a difficult case for the prosecutor. I don’t think it’s impossible, but I think 
it will be difficult. And as Rebecca mentioned I think the key is going 
94.  “Crimes Against Humanity,” Trial International, https://trialinternational.org/topics 
-post/crimes-against-humanity/.
95.  Steve Sandford, “Rohingya End Hard Year Still in Limbo,” Voice of America, Dec. 26, 
2018, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/rohingya-end-hard-year-still-limbo.
96.  Williams & Levy, supra note 21.
97.  Id. 
98.  Id.
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to be the linkage evidence, and the key might also be which individual 
the ICC actually indicts if there’s a person indicted. Some of the recent 
cases at the ICC have demonstrated that it is really difficult to start at the 
top. That it is really difficult to start with the indictment of the president, 
prime minister, foreign minister. That it might be easier to start with the 
mid-level commander, and that evidence might be easier to gather. And 
then as Rebecca mentioned, the biggest problem is going to be that the 
government of Myanmar is not likely to cooperate at all. The government 
of Bangladesh is, but the linkage evidence is certainly not going to be in 
Bangladesh; it is going to be within the Myanmar government.
scharf: So as you’ve been describing it, because of the limits of the 
International Criminal Court, this cannot be a genocide case. Is it worth-
while for the United States or other countries to try to pursue a genocide 
prosecution in some other forum, maybe using universal jurisdiction as 
Paul mentioned earlier anybody?
sterio: Well Michael, different countries around the world have universal 
jurisdiction statutes, but for the most part universal jurisdiction prosecu-
tions tend to be quite unpopular.99 They’re seen by many as a waste of that 
country’s resources, court time, if you’re prosecuting someone who maybe 
committed horrible things in Myanmar and Bangladesh but has no con-
nection to your country. So as of now I don’t really see the political will 
anywhere to have a national level prosecution. The question might be if 
there’s some kind of a hybrid or mixed tribunal set up in the near future, 
and we have seen those in Sierra Leone and in other countries.100
scharf: Now Syria is a situation that is quite different than how you 
described, and in part that’s because there are refugees both victims and 
high-level perpetrators that have found themselves in France and in Ger-
many and in other countries in Europe and they are prosecuting those 
people under universal jurisdiction.101 
sterio: Yes Michael, there’s a universal jurisdiction case that just recently 
began in Germany where there’s a Syrian national who’s being prosecuted 
99.  “Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction,” Human Rights Watch, Oct. 19, 2009, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/19/basic-facts-universal-jurisdiction.
100.  “The Special Court for Sierra Leone,” Human Rights Watch, Apr. 11, 2012, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/11/special-court-sierra-leone.
101.  “Justice for Syria in Swedish and German Courts,” Human Rights Watch, Oct. 3, 2017, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/03/these-are-crimes-we-are-fleeing/justice-syria 
-swedish-and-german-courts.
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in Germany under universal jurisdiction but the difference there is that that 
person was actually in Germany already and was arrested in Germany.102 
As you said there’s a large number of Syrian refugees in Germany or other 
European countries and so that’s quite different than a situation where you 
know most of the Rohingya refugees are in Bangladesh or somewhere else.
scharf: At the end of our second segment, Rebecca Hamilton, you 
were suggesting that maybe prosecutions are not the best way to handle 
this or at least people should start thinking about civil suits. Where do you 
see that going?
hamilton: So just to clarify, my position is not that with respect to the 
perpetrators of genocide but when we are talking about a company like 
Facebook that has facilitated the commission of these crimes.103 I don’t think 
intentionally either but that’s where I see a role for civil liability coming 
into play. And I think there is a risk that we’re seeing played out in every 
country in the world that whenever horrible things happen we think “Oh 
we’ve got to turn to the International Criminal Court.” I think we need 
to make sure that we have space for other forms of liability as well.
williams: I would just agree with Rebecca and follow up on that that 
as a nation we have to decide and as a government whether we’re seri-
ous or not about the fact that genocide has been committed against the 
Rohingya, that there’s a million refugees, and that there’s you know the 
largest refugee camp has been created from this crisis.104 And you know we 
have an American company, Facebook, which is complicit in or aiding and 
abetting this process.105 We have very vested strategic interests in this part 
of the world.106 We’ve been a leader in the past in creating these tribunals. 
We’ve got to just throw up our hands and say actually we don’t care or 
102.  Cathrin Schaer, “Prosecuting Syrian War-Crimes Suspect from Berlin,” The Atlantic, 
July 31, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/can-germany 
-convict-syrian-war-criminals/595054/.
103.  Paul Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar’s Military,” 
New York Times, Oct. 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology 
/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html.
104.  “Rohingya Crisis,” Human Rights Watch, Aug. 25, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/tag 
/rohingya-crisis.
105.  Tom Miles, “UN Investigators Cite Facebook Role in Myanmar Crisis,” Reuters, Mar. 
12, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-facebook/u-n 
-investigators-cite-facebook-role-in-myanmar-crisis-idUSKCN1GO2PN.
106.  “US Relations with Burma,” US Dept of State, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations 
-with-burma/.
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if we do care we need to promote or need to pursue the civil avenues. 
We need to pursue the criminal avenues against the American companies 
that are engaged or supporting or allowing this to happen through their 
artificial intelligence algorithms and we need to put our shoulder behind 
the international mechanisms to hold these folks accountable. We can’t 
sort of dabble around well it’s a genocide, well it’s complicated, and I think 
this panel has been very assertive and aggressive about how there’s a lot of 
avenues that we could be pursuing.
scharf: Let me play devil’s advocate here. Paul, why should the United 
States and its people care about something that’s going on way over there 
in Burma to some people that we’ve never even heard of before?
williams: Yeah, we just need to make that decision. We care, or we don’t 
care. Let’s not pretend to care because then you create the false expectations, 
the false hope, and you undermine what the victims really need which is 
accountability and justice. So we’re either going to be engaged and we’re 
going to occupy the vacuum of stability and security around the globe or 
we’re not and somebody else will. And we see what happens when we don’t 
take the field and someone else does take the field. You see it in Burma. 
You see it in Syria.107 You see it in Yemen.108
scharf: Now Ambassador Buchwald, it was your job to make people 
care, right?
buchwald: I think we should care. 
scharf: Why?
buchwald: I think it’s a manifestation of our deepest values as a nation 
to care about people in a situation like this. It is unconscionable what’s 
happening. And it may be far away, but I think if the issue is explained 
to Americans—if they’re aware of it—they do care. It’s part of the deep-
est values of the country. And I don’t think that we can have an effective 
foreign policy on human rights from a human rights orientation or from a 
security orientation that disregards it. It’s inconceivable to me.
hamilton: We absolutely can and should make the values case for 
why we need to care, but I think on top of that there’s a very compelling 
107.  “Syria Crisis: 8 Years of the Syrian War,” UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/ph 
/campaigns/syria-crisis-8-years.
108.  “Yemen Crisis,” UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/yemen-crisis.
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self-interested case to make. We see this in Syria. When a terrible crime 
happens in a country, people flee, and the impact of that migration is felt in 
countries around the world.109 And so this idea that something is happening 
over there and therefore it doesn’t concern us, that’s just simply not viable 
in the world that we live in.
scharf: Paul, you were actually at the refugee camps, right?
williams: Yes, in the refugee camps talking with the Rohingya. 
scharf: What did that look like?
williams: It looked like the worst nightmare you can think of with 
a refugee camp. There were 900,000 people basically pushed into a very 
narrow band of territory with no services whatsoever other than what the 
UN had brought was able to bring in.110
scharf: Okay, so in my last minute I want to ask a really controversial 
and provocative question: the Prime Minister of Burma, who won the 
Nobel Peace Prize and is seen as somebody who is a human rights advocate, 
she’s just sitting there letting this happen.111 How is that possible? What 
are we to make of that?
sterio: I think, again to go back to the definition of genocide, if you 
were to try to charge someone like her for genocide, you’d have to prove 
that she had this special intent to destroy in whole or in part the Rohingya 
group. So unless you can find, as Rebecca said, the linkage evidence for 
that, that is really really hard to prosecute. You can’t prosecute someone for 
omission to commit genocide. So I think while she probably should face 
some kind of criminal liability, I’m not sure that the International Criminal 
Court would be the best institution as of now to prosecute someone like her.
scharf: So international responsibility aside, should we be very unhappy 
with her? Does she have any moral responsibility here?
buchwald: We should be very unhappy, yes we should. She has a certain 
position. The civilian control over the military is not a concept there, but 
109.  Jon Stone, “Syrian Refugee Crisis: How Different Countries Have Responded,” 
Independent, Sep. 1, 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/syrian-refugee 
-crisis-how-different-countries-have-responded-france-lebanon-uk-a7220616.html.
110.  Williams & Levy, supra note 21.
111.  Hannah Ellis Petersen, “From Peace Icon to Pariah: Aung San Suu Kyi’s Fall from 
Grace,” Guardian Nov. 23, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/23 
/aung-san-suu-kyi-fall-from-grace-myanmar. 
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she doesn’t stand up and she doesn’t add a moral voice to the extent that it 
needs to be. And I think if nothing else it’s important to keep both legal 
and political pressure on her to do what she can to be a counterweight. She 
does carry a sort of moral authority in the world and she needs to use it.
scharf: All right, now that gives us a lot to think about. Our producer 
is indicating that it’s time to wrap up our program. This has gone way too 
fast, but Paul Williams, Milena Sterio, Todd Buchwald, Jen Domino, and 
Rebecca Hamilton thank you all so much for providing your insights on 
the crisis in Burma. I’m Michael Scharf, you’ve been listening to Talking 
Foreign Policy.
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